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ing a difficult time making her payments on the 
property. fo~ . this reason; that she therefore· wanted 
her attorney to do what was necessary in order to 
get the payments up to date. In accordance with this 
information the defendanf s attorney prepared a 
notice of default on the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract, and had the same served upon the· plaintiff at 
her residence in . the State of Washington. In re-
sponse to this service, the plaintiff came to Salt Lake 
City and. had a conference with defendant's attorney, 
after which it was determined how much was due 
and owing on the contract; and plaintiff informed 
defendant's attorney that she would. take care of 
this matter within a very short time. Nothing was 
ever done on it after this conference; whereupon 
the plaintiff herein was served with a notice of re-
possession of the property in accordance with the 
con tract between the two parties. 
According to the file of this Ci;lSe, the plaintiff 
thereafter contacted a Salt Lake. City attorney, and 
on the 7th day of July,196l, commenced this action 
by service of summons upon the defendant. the ac-
tion concerning this property. The defendant, within 
four or five days thereafter/ delivered the ~aid. sum-
mons and complaint to the office of her attorneyr 
Norman Wade/ and requested that .the. attorney to. 
protect her interest in the matter. These said ·papers 
were inadvertently and mistakenly set .aside,. and 
the attorney for the defendant herein ;,as under the 
impression that an answer to ·the complaint had be~n 
prepared and .filed w1thin the proper twenty-day 
period. The a.ttorney believed that_ saicl· matter had 
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been taken care of and that the defendant's interests 
were protected. On the first day of September, 1961, 
the defendant called her attorney, Norman Wade, 
and asked him why her interests had not been pro-
tected, stating that a judgment had been entered 
against her. Thereafter, the attorney checked with 
the County Clerk's Office and confirmed this fact. 
On t~e 11th day of September, 1961, defendant's 
attorney filed a motion to set aside the default judg-
ment along with an affidavit and answer to the case, 
which papers are on file in the record. The said 
motion to set asi<;le the default judgment was heard 
by the Court and the Court denied the said motion; 
and defendant herein appeals from the said Court's 
denial of the motion to set aside the default judg-
ment. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
ITS DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
· MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DE-
F:AULT JUDGMENT ON FILE HERE-
IN. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT. COURT ERRED IN 
ITS DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DE-
FAULT JUDGMENT ON FILE HERE-
IN. 
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:ThE? defendanf s motion, as seen from the papers 
in the file, was made in accordance with Rule 60(b) 
of -the _Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads as 
follows: 
- 1: ~'Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly 
Discovered Evidenc,e, Fraud, etc. On motion and 
. up.on such. terms as are just the Court may, in 
! !furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal 
-<representative from a final judgment, order or pro-
ceeding for. the following reasons: (1) Mistake, in-
advertence, surprise or excusable neglect . . . The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons 1, 2, 3 or 4, not more than three months 
after judgment, order or proceeding was entered or 
taken ... " 
As the Utah Supreme Court pointed out in the 
case of Echo Ney, Trustees, Wasatch Homes, Inc. vs. 
G. T. Harrison and Alda J. Harrison, 299 Pac 2d, 114, 
Rule 60(b), is substantially the same as former Sec-
tion 104-14-40 Utah Code Annotated, 1943; and Re-
visedStatutes of 1898, Section 3005; and 2 Compiled 
laws 1888, Section 3200; compiled laws of 1876, Sec-
tion 1293, page 417; and therefore we have a sub-
stantial number of cases which have been tried in 
Utah which give us the principles the Court should 
keep in· mind in determining whether the default 
judgment should be set aside or not. Federal Rule 
60(b) is substantially ·the same as the Utah Rules of 
C~vil ,Procedure 60(b). As a matter of fact, the Utah 
Rul~ w:as taken from it. The only difference between 
th.e' rules are these: (I) Utah Rules list as separate 
reasons for setting aside the_ judgment, "(4) when, 
for any cause, the summons in an action has not 
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been personal! y served upon·· the defendant as re-
quired by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to 
appear in said action.// Federal Rule· 60(b) has no 
such separate reason listed. (2) For reasons 1/ 2/ 3 
and 4/ Utah has a three month time limit while the 
Federal Rule has a one year time limit. This motion 
to set aside the judgment iri this case was made un-
der thE? Section t of the Utah Rules .of Civil Pro-
cedure; and therefore the three-month time limit is 
applicable. However, the !notion to set aside the 
judgment was made well within· that three :inonths 
time limit and was made as soon as was possible 
after the defendant was aware that a default judg-
ment had been taken against her. 
The purpose of Hule 60(b) -when: it was first en-
acted/ along with its Utah predecessors/ (see above)/ 
and at the present time; is to give defendants who 
have a valid and bono. fide defense against plain-
tiffs cause of action, relief from default judgment and 
to allow cases to be tried on. their merits. Hund vs. 
Ford/ 74 Utah 46/ 276 Pac.. 908; Echo Ney vs. G~ T. 
Harrison and Alda J. Harrison/ -----· __ Utah --------~ 299 
Pac. 2d 114; Warren vs. :Dixon Ranch Co;, ________ Utah 
••• , ____ 1 260 Pac 2d 7 41; Ellington vs. Miln; 18 F.R. Serv-
ice, 606 .24 Case L 1953; Erich Rios Bridoux vs. 
Eastern Airlines/ 214 F. 2d 207/ 19 F.R. Service 60b 
x 29 Case 2/ 1951. See also the cases following. 
In the Utah vase of Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., 
________ Utah ________ 
1 
260 Pac 2d 741/ the Utah Supreme 
Court said: 
"The allow:ance of a vacation of judgment is a crea-
ture of equity designed to relieve against harshness 
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--~ of: enfoidng a judgment which may occur through 
··procedural dificulties, the wrongs of opposing party, 
()r misfortunes., which prevent the presentation of 
a claim or defense. Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure outlines the situations wherein a party 
may berelieved from a final judgment ... " 
In that same case the Court said further: 
_"Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of jus-
- tice, and the Court will incline toward granting re-
ief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may 
have a hearing." 
See also Hund vs. Ford, 74 Utah 46,276 Pac. 908. 
In 1947 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Eighth' Circuit, said in Assman vs. Fleming, 159 Fed. 
2fict~332, 10 F.R. Service/ 60b .25/ Case l: 
--_) ~ 
-: · -"It is elementary that courts favor the trial of causes 
t -- of action upon their merits, and hence judgment by 
default or by confession are within the rule confer-
ring power on courts to open or vacate their own 
judgments." 
The court furthe-r said: 
"It must also be made to appear where the applica-
tion is made by defendant that he has a meritorious 
·: r defense to the action. If, however, there are ade-
quate allegations of a meritorious defense, prope·rly 
verified, no counter showing will be received to 
re.fute the alle·gations or merits presented by the 
moving party." 
In the case of Toza:r vs. harles A. Krause Mill-
ing Cq:, 179 Fed. 2d, 242, l95t 15 F.R. Service, 60b 
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.24, Case 1, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit said: 
"Matters should not be determined by de·fault judg-
ments if it c.an be reasonably avoided. Any doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the petition to set 
aside the judgment so that cases may be dedded on 
their merits." 
In the case of 'In the Matter of the Estate of Cre-
midas' 18 Fed. Reserve Service 60b x 29, Case 3, 14 
F.R.D. 15, Alaska, 1953, the Court held that relief from 
judgments and orders is in the discretion of. the 
Court and that discretion should ordinarily incline 
toward granting reliet especially if no intervening 
rights have attached in reliance upon judgment and 
on actual injustice will ensue. Relief should be grant-
ed where a litigant has not been afforded an oppor-
tunity to have his case decided on the merits, as 
where it is alleged and not denied that the moving 
party's lawyer was intoxicated at the time of the 
hearing and unable to present party's case. 
The Utah Courts have consistently followed the 
principles laid down by the Federal Courts in the 
cases quoted above from early times up until the 
present. This can be seen from the following quota-
tions from the Utah Supreme Court: 
On June 30, 1898, the Utah Supreme Court said 
in Utah Commercial.and Savings Bank vs. Trumbo, 
17 Utah 189, 53 Pac. 1033: 
"The policy of the law is that every man shall have 
his day in court before judgment shall be entered 
against him, and where a judgment by default has 
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been entered;· and within a proper time a good de-
fense to the action in which the judgment was 
entered was made to appear, the default will be 
vacated, and the judgment set aside to permit trial 
on the merits, or the circumstances which led to the 
default are. such as to 'cause the court to hesitate, it 
. is better to resove the doubt in favor of the applica-
tion, so that a trialmay be secured on the merits." 
On June 11, 1907, ·in the· case of Cutler vs. Hay-
cock~' · 2 Utah, 354, 90 Pac. 897, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed judgmerit.of the trial court because 
it had abused its discretion in refusing to set aside 
a verdict and said: 
"As has been weli said, in all doubtful cases the gen-
eral rule of courts is to incline towards granting re-
lief from default, and to bring about a judgment on 
the merits. This rule, as appears from authorities, 
is of almost universal application ... " 
On this point see also Vol. L Black on Judgments, 
Section 354; Cameron vs. CarrolL 67 Cal 500, 8 Pac. 
45; Wolfe vs. Canadian Pacific Railroad, 89 Cal 332,· 
26 Pac. 825; and Weston vs. S. F. & B. Ry. Co., 41 Cal 
17; 
In August of 1953, the Utah Court made the 
statement ·in Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Company, 
quoted earlier in this brief. 
These principles of the Utah Court have been 
affirmed right up to the present time, as can be seen 
from the case of Echo Ney, Trustee, Wasatch Homes, 
Inc. vs. G. T. Harrison and Alda J. Harrison, ______ Utah 
________ 299 Pac. 2d J 14, decided in July of 1956. In that 
case the Utah Court. cites 68-3-2, Utah Code Annotat-
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ed 1953, which says that all Court cites 68-3-2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, which says that all provisions 
are to be construed liberally with a view to effect 
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. 
The Court further says in that case, "The statutory 
authority has been liberally construed to the end 
that there be trial on the merits beginning with our 
earliest decisions." The Court then went on to re-
affirm the opinion in Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co. 
In that particular case the Utah Court held that 
eleven months after default judgment was rendered 
was within a reasonable time requirement, as of 
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
From the above citations and q1,.1.otations, the 
following rules can be determined for a trial court 
to follow in ruling under 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
l. Relief from judgments and orders is within 
the discretion of the trial court. Echo N ey vs. Harri-
son, supra; Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 Pac 2d, 
741; Utah Commercial & Savings Bank vs. Trumbo, 
1898, 17 Utah 189 and 53 Pac. 1033; Cutler vs. Hay-
cock, 1907, 32 Utah, 354, 90 Pac. 897. 
2. This discretion should be used in the further-
ance of justice and equity. Echo Ney vs. Harrison, 
supra; Warren vs. Dixon Rancho Co., 260 Pac. 2d, 
741; Commercial Savings Bank vs. Trumbo, 1898, 17 
Utah 189, 53 Pac. 1033; Cutler vs. Haycock, 1907, 32 
Utah 354, 90 Pac. 897. 
3. The court favors trial of all causes of action 
on their merits. Echo Ney vs. Harrison, supra; War-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
reri vs. Dixon Ranch Co., supra; Utah Commercial 
Savings Bank vs. Trumbo, supra; Cutler vs. Hay-
cock, .supra; Assman vs. Fleming, 159 Fed. 2nd, 332, 
10 F.R. Service, 60b, 25, Case 1. Tozar vs. Charles A. 
Krause Milling Co., 179 Fed. 2nd, 242, 15 F.R. Serv-
ice, 60b .24, Case l. 
4. If a meritorious defense is shown and there 
are no intervening equities, the court should be lib-
eral in determining what is a justifiable excuse for 
allowing a default to be taken. All of the above cases 
cited hold this. 
5. All do·uht which the court may have as to 
whether or not a default judgme·nt sho·uld be set 
aside should be resolved in favor of the defendant, 
so that the trial of the case on its merits may be had. 
(All cases cited above.) 
6. Decisions of the trial court under Rule 60(b) 
will not be upset by an appellate court, unless abuse 
of discretion is clearly shown. Echo Ney vs. Harrison, 
supra; Vvarren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., supra. 
In accordance with these principles it can be 
seen that the trial court did abuse its discretion. The 
answer on. file in this case definitely and clearly 
stated a defense to the action which was brought by 
the plaintiff. The affidavit of defendanfs attorney 
states that it was just a mistake and inadvertence 
which caused that the answer was not filed within 
the proper time, as defined by the rules. This case 
ought to be tried on its merits. The court ought to 
have evidence in front of it with which to determine 
the issues of the· case; and no party would be done 
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an injustice in having the case tried on its merits. 
Under the facts, as before this court, the defendant 
in this case would be done a complete injustice if 
she were not allowed to present her side of the case 
to the court. She, in accordance with the summons 
served upon her, within the allowable time sent the 
said summons to a licensed practicing attorney 01 
Salt Lake County, which attorney had knowledge of 
the defense which she had to the said case, and she 
trusted the said attorney to represent her and protect 
her interests, and give her a c h an c e to get into 
court to present her defense to the case. The attor-
ney, through inadvertence, failed to do this, but just 
as soon as it was made known to the defendant, she 
again called her attorney, and the attorney prepared 
a motion to vacate and set aside the said judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that in this present case that if justice 
is to be done, the defendant should have her day 
in court and be allowed to present her defense to 
the case which plaintiff brought against her. 
For these reasons, the District Court's failure to 
set aside the default judgment should be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted by: 
NORMAN WADE 
Attorney for Appellant 
and Defendant. 
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